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THE EFFECT OF HURST V. FLORIDA  





Montez Spradley should be dead. A trial judge in Alabama over-
rode a jury’s decision to sentence Mr. Spradley to life in prison and sen-
tenced him to die for a crime that he did not commit.1 The judge was 
well aware of the unreliability of a key witness in the case against Mr. 
Spradley and that information regarding the witness’ reliability had 
been withheld from his attorneys.2  In 2011, Mr. Spradley entered into 
an Alford plea, pleading guilty to the crime while maintaining his inno-
cence, and escaped death row and prison after nine and a half years.3 
Walter McMillian, a Black man, was sentenced to die for the murder of 
a white woman in Monroe County, Alabama.4 Like the judge in Montez 
Spradley’s case, Judge Robert E. Lee Key overrode the jury’s life ver-
dict and imposed the death penalty on Mr. McMillian.5 He spent six 
years on death row before being exonerated due to the fact that the 
State’s witnesses had lied on the stand, and the prosecution suppressed 
exculpatory evidence.6 Equal Justice Initiative asserted in 2011 that of 
the ninety-three people sentenced to death by judicial override in the 
                                                          
© 2018 Carolyn Schorr 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.   
I would like to thank my family and my husband for their support throughout my law school 
experience. Special thanks to Katy O’Donnell, Karyn Meriwether, and Brandon Taylor for their 
mentorship and love while writing this Comment.  
1 Andrew Cohen, ‘I’m Just Happy to Be Alive,’ THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 20, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/10/i-m-just-happy-to-be-alive. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 66 (Spiegel & Grau 
2015) (2014). 
5 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 22 (2011), 
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judge-override.pdf [hereinafter 
DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA]. The Equal Justice Initiative, founded in 1989 by Bryan Steven-
son, is “committed to ending mass incarceration and excessive punishment in the United States, 
to challenging racial and economic injustice, and to protecting basic human rights for the most 
vulnerable people in American society.” About EJI, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
https://eji.org/about-eji (last visited Jan 3, 2019). 
6 Id.  
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state of Alabama, “37% left death row after their convictions or sen-
tences were reversed.”7 
 
Capital punishment in the United States has been on the decline 
with regards to public perception, with a 2017 Gallup poll indicating 
that support for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972.8 The insti-
tutions supporting the death penalty have had to react to this change in 
the American consciousness, enacting slow reform to a broken system.9  
In the midst of the bipartisan push for criminal justice reform,10 Ala-
bama remained the only state utilizing the archaic process of judicial 
override.11 Judicial override was enacted as a political response to the 
abolition of the death penalty by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Geor-
gia.12 Judicial override gives a trial judge the ability to override a jury’s 
advisory sentence in a capital punishment case,13 and in the majority of 
judicial override cases in Alabama, a judge has overridden a jury’s rec-
ommendation of life in prison with the death sentence.14 A recent Su-
preme Court case, Hurst v. Florida, holds that the Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury to be the ultimate fact-finder in order to sentence a de-
fendant to death.15 As a result, Alabama’s legislature amended its capital 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Brett Samuels, Support for Death Penalty at Lowest Level in 45 Years, THE HILL (Oct. 26, 
2017, 9:56 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/357285-support-for-death-
penalty-at-lowest-level-in-45-years (noting that in 1972, 50% of people supported the death 
penalty for convicted murderers). 
9 Jon Herskovitz, U.S. Death Penalties, Executions Slow as Capital Punishment is Squeezed, 
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2015, 9:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-execution/u-s-
death-penalties-executions-slow-as-capital-punishment-is-squeezed-
idUSKCN0T40OV20151115 (discussing state, prosecutorial, and lawmaker responses to insti-
tuted death penalty reforms). 
10 Seung Min Kim, Senators Unveil Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform Package, POLITICO 
(Oct. 4, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/04/senate-bipartisan-bill-
criminal-justice-reform-243455; Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-
criminal-justice-bill.html?login=email&auth=login-email. 
11 Gigi Douban, Alabama Lawmakers Move to Abolish Judicial Override, NPR (Mar. 2, 2017, 
4:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/02/518197090/alabama-lawmakers-move-to-abolish-
judicial-override. 
12 See DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 9–10. “States responded to Furman by 
implementing new capital sentencing statutes that established procedures to regularize imposi-
tion of the death penalty and minimize the risk that death sentences will be imposed in error or 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Id. 
13 Id. at 10. 
14 Id. at 4 (“Since 1976, Alabama judges have overridden jury verdicts 107 times. Although 
judges have authority to override life or death verdicts, in 92% of overrides elected judges have 
overruled jury verdicts of life to impose the death penalty.”). 
15 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 622 (2016). 
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punishment statute to remove judicial override as an option in death sen-
tencing.16  
 
This Comment examines the history of judicial override in Ala-
bama, the impact of Hurst v. Florida17 on capital punishment sentenc-
ing, and the steps that Alabama has taken to remove the last remnants 
of judicial override.18 It also examines how the legislation has struggled 
to fully eradicate the process from the state’s criminal justice system. 
Specifically, Alabama’s prosecutors have pushed to have judicial over-
ride as an option for defendants who were charged, but not convicted, 
of capital murder prior to the legislation enactment date.19 However, this 
Comment argues that by looking at the legislative intent and language 
of the act, the judiciary has an obligation to no longer utilize judicial 
override to uphold the Constitutional standards set forth in Hurst.20  Part 
II provides an overview of the judicial override system and how it was 
enacted in Alabama after the seminal case of Furman v. Georgia.21 It 
also examines the politicized role of judges in the state of Alabama and 
how that has affected the use of judicial override.22 Part III.A. provides 
an overview of the landmark Supreme Court case Hurst v. Florida, and 
how it struck down Florida state’s capital sentencing scheme that in-
cluded judicial override.23 Part III.B. examines how Delaware proac-
tively removed judicial override from its sentencing procedures post-
Hurst and how that set the stage for Alabama’s groundbreaking legisla-
tion.24 Part IV focuses on the Alabama legislation and breaks down what 
the legislation consists of and its effect on the sentencing structure.25 
Part V examines the status of capital sentencing in Alabama today and 
the conflict that remains in the application of the legislation.26  
 
                                                          
16 Ryan Lovelace, Alabama Knocks Down Judicial Override in Death Penalty Cases, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Apr. 12, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alabama-
knocks-down-judicial-override-in-death-penalty-cases; Kim Chandler & Anthony Izaguirre, 
Lawmakers Bar Alabama Judges from Overriding Juries, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-04/alabama-house-to-
vote-on-ending-judicial-override. 
17 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). 
18 See infra Part IV. 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 See infra Part III.A. 
21 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); infra Part II. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III.A. 
24 See infra Part III.B. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 See infra Part V. 
SCHORR   
2018] EFFECT OF HURST V. FLORIDA 393 
II. ALABAMA’S USE OF JUDICIAL OVERRIDE POST-FURMAN AND 
THE POLITICIZATION OF ALABAMA’S JUDICIARY 
 
In the historic case of Furman v. Georgia,27 the Supreme Court 
set the stage for today’s death penalty sentencing structure. The Court 
ruled that in order for the death penalty to adhere to the constitutional 
standard set forth in the Eighth Amendment, death penalty sentencing 
needs to be “evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require 
judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, 
and spottily to unpopular groups.”28 In attempts to comply with Furman, 
the states scrambled to adjust their death penalty statutes and the Court 
approved numerous death penalty schemes in 1976.29 While executions 
had increasingly become less frequent in the United States prior to the 
Furman decision, states leapt at the chance to fight back against the fed-
eral government, seeing the Furman decision as an affront to states’ 
rights.30  Within the 1976 capital punishment decisions, the Court laid 
out four guiding principles to ensure that states’ death penalty schemes 
would remain constitutional:  
 
[S]tates must guide sentencing discretion and narrow the 
class of offenders subject to the punishment; (2) the 
death penalty must be proportionate to the offense trig-
gering the punishment; (3) defendants must receive an 
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the 
                                                          
27 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
28 Id. at 256. 
29 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (noting the new sentencing procedures “focus 
the jury’s attention” and avoid the jury from “wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the death 
sentence”); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259–60  (1976) (holding Florida’s post-Furman 
legislation “passes constitutional muster”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 
(1976) (finding North Carolina failed to “provide a constitutionally tolerable response to Fur-
man’s rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences”); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (noting that by “narrowing its definition of capital murder[,]” 
Texas’ capital sentencing procedures do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (holding Louisiana’s “mandatory death sentence 
statute also fails to comply with Furman’s requirement that standardless jury discretion be re-
placed by procedures that safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death 
sentences”). 
30 Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 289 
(2008); See also DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN 
AGE OF ABOLITION 248 (2010) (“Furman’s invalidation of capital punishment was read in the 
South as an illegitimate attack on the region’s cultural traditions by outside elites.”); CAROL S. 
STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 75 (2016) (“By 1972, the controversy over busing and President Nixon’s success-
ful politicization of criminal justice issues intensified the backlash [of Furman] in ways that 
likely would have been avoided a half decade earlier.”).  
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death penalty that includes consideration of their charac-
ter, background, and the circumstances of the offense; 
and (4) the categorical difference between death and all 
other punishments (“death is different”) requires that 
capital proceedings be especially fair and reliable.31   
 
Essentially, all of the death penalty states enacted a bifurcated 
capital trial system, creating two separate trials: the guilt-innocence 
phase and the sentencing phase.32 This created a new responsibility for 
prosecutors in cases where the death penalty was on the table, as they 
needed to be able to prove to the jury the presence of specific aggravat-
ing factors in order to justify putting a defendant to death.33  
 
The Supreme Court in 1976 did not create a clear standard for 
whether the burden of capital sentencing relies on the judge or the jury.34  
In fact, in Proffitt v. Florida, the Court recognized the “important soci-
etal function” of “jury sentencing in a capital case,” but that it is not 
“suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”35 Through 
various decisions, the Court clarified that capital cases required a weigh-
ing of aggravating and mitigating factors, regardless of who determined 
the sentence, in order to decide if someone should be sentenced to 
death.36 This weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was to en-
sure that the capital punishment system remained consistent and consti-
tutional.37  
 
                                                          
31 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 30, at 71. 
32 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. In Gregg, the Court stated: 
  
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not 
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures the sentencing authority is given adequate infor-
mation and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met 
by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentenc-
ing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of 
sentence and provided with standards to guides its use of the information.  
Id. 
33 Smith, supra note 30, at 290. 
34 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Roberts, 428 U.S. 
325. 
35 428 U.S. at 252 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)). 
36 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (discussing the importance of “relevant facets of the character and record 
of the individual offender or circumstances”). 
37 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459–60. 
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Due to the Court’s vague stance on a capital sentencing standard, 
the Alabama legislature enacted judicial override.38  Under this legisla-
tion, after a jury decided whether to sentence a defendant charged with 
a capital crime to death, the trial judge only needed to treat this decision 
as advisory, giving judges the ability to override a jury’s sentencing de-
cision.39 Alabama’s practice of judicial override was indirectly pro-
tected by the Court’s decision in Spaziano v. Florida,40 where the Court 
upheld Florida’s sentencing scheme, which allowed a judge to treat jury 
verdicts as merely advisory in nature and not binding on the court, as 
constitutional.41 The Court asserted that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does 
not require jury sentencing, that the demands of fairness and reliability 
in capital cases do not require it, and that neither the nature of, nor the 
purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we [the 
Court] cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to 
impose the sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional.”42  
 
Harris v. Alabama43 directly upheld Alabama’s judicial override 
statute, with the Court using its decision in Spaziano44 to assert that it 
was acceptable to “vest sentencing authority in the judge and relegate 
the jury to an advisory role.”45 While Florida and Alabama’s sentencing 
statutes were extremely similar, they differed on one important part. 
Florida judges were required to give jury recommendations “great 
weight,”46 while Alabama judges were required to “consider [only] the 
recommendation of the jury.”47 Through Harris, the Court declined to 
enforce the stricter standard used in Florida on Alabama, citing the fear 
of infringing on states’ rights, as well as arguing that “the Eighth 
Amendment does not require the State to define the weight the sentenc-
ing judge must accord an advisory jury verdict.”48  
 
                                                          
38 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45–47 (1975). 
39 Id. at § 13A-5-46. 
40 468 U.S. 447, 466 (1984). 
41 Id. at 464. 
42 Id.  
43 513 U.S. 504 (1995). 
44 See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
45 Harris, 513 U.S. at 509. 
46 Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). 
47 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (2005). In the 2017 amendment, subsection (e) was deleted. See 
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2017). 
48 Harris, 513 U.S. at 512 (asserting that forcing Alabama to follow Florida’s sentencing struc-
ture “would offend these established principles and place within constitutional ambit microman-
agement tasks that properly rest within the State’s discretion to administer its criminal justice 
system”). 
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Historically, the use of judicial override in Alabama was seem-
ingly applied arbitrarily, with inconsistent patterns of reasoning emerg-
ing from the bench for their decisions to override a jury’s recommenda-
tion.49  Between 1976 and 2011, Alabama judges overrode jury 
sentences in capital punishment cases 107 times.50 Of those overrides, 
92 percent of the cases ended in a judge overriding a jury’s recommen-
dation of life in prison to sentence the defendant to death.51 Under the 
statute, Alabama judges needed to give the jury recommendation some 
consideration, but the extent to which judges considered the jury’s ad-
visory sentence remained ambiguous and subject to inconsistencies.52  
These inconsistences include differing judicial weighing of mitigating 
factors such as the jury’s decision to sentence the defendant to life,53 the 
defendant’s age,54 and the defendant’s mental capacity.55  Historically, 
                                                          
49 See Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty 
Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5, 28–32 (1994). Between 1981 and 1991, thirty out of thirty-six judicial 
override sentencing orders were available. Id. at 28. In ten of the cases, the trial court offered 
varied reasons for the override. Id. at 31. Russell further provides that: 
 
In four of these cases, the trial court stated that it found that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed mitigating ones to a moral certainty . . . . In five 
of these cases, the trial court concluded that the heinousness of the crime 
was pivotal to its decision to override. Three of these cases where the trial 
court took into account a crime’s heinousness also cite the deterrence ra-
tionale for capital punishment. In the single remaining case . . . the trial 
court offered a standard for its decision to override: ‘[T]he Court finds that 
there is a reasonable basis for enhancing the jury’s recommendation of sen-
tence.’ 
Id. at 31–32 (emphasis in original). 
50 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 7. 
51 Id. at 14.  
52 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2009) (“In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall deter-
mine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances it finds to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the 
jury contained in its advisory verdict . . . . While the jury’s recommendation concerning sentence 
shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court.”). 
53 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 19 (“In the majority (57) of life-to-death over-
rides, judges did not consider the jury’s life verdict as a mitigating factor weighing against im-
position of the death penalty.”). 
54 Id. (“Nine judges have refused to find that the defendant’s age of 20-22 was mitigating at all; 
four judges found that same age range to be mitigating; and one found it mitigating that the 
defendant was as old as 26.”). 
55 Id. at 20. (“In his order condemning John Neal to death despite the jury’s life verdict, Baldwin 
County Judge Charles Partin determined that Mr. Neal’s 65 IQ classified him as having mild 
mental retardation, but the judge asserted that ‘[t]he sociological literature suggests Gypsies 
intentionally test low on standard IQ tests’ . . . . Macon County Judge Dale Segrest relied on his 
own reading about personality disorders to conclude that Edward Evans was attempting to ‘stage 
insanity’ and did not in fact suffer from a mental disease or defect . . . because it would be 
‘dangerous policy for the law to suggest that the very factors that propel a defendant into a life 
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the application of judicial override disproportionately affected African-
American defendants.56 These inconsistences indicate judicial override 
was applied arbitrarily, without a standard that could be easily recog-
nized by defendants or their attorneys.  
 
A major flaw in the judicial override system that is omnipresent 
in Alabama is the politicization of the judiciary within the state.57 Fol-
lowing Furman,58 support for capital punishment weakened on a na-
tional level; it was not until politicians turned capital punishment  into 
a partisan battle that support for the death penalty rose.59 Death sen-
tences rose greatly after Furman.60 Citizens of states began to look 
closer at judges and where they stood on the death penalty in criminal 
cases.61 Carol and Jordan Steiker analyzed why the United States re-
mains the only Western democracy to keep capital punishment as law, 
writing that our culture is one focused on punitiveness mostly because 
“[c]riminal justice in the United States is primarily a local function, and 
the politics surrounding criminal justice tend to be more populist than 
bureaucratic . . . .”62 That culture is prominent in Alabama local judicial 
elections.  
 
Alabama’s use of judicial override can be linked to the fact that 
trial court judges in Alabama are elected, and the “tough on crime” plat-
form has consistently resonated with Southern voters.63 Trial judges in 
                                                          
of crime in some way mitigate a defendant’s personal responsibility for the criminal activity.’ 
Mr. Evans hanged himself shortly after Judge Segrest overrode and sentenced him to death.”). 
56 Id. at 18 (“African Americans in Alabama constitute 26% of the total population . . . [and] 
more than half of the overrides in Alabama have imposed the death penalty on African-Ameri-
can defendants.”). 
57 See Judicial Selection, EQUAL JUSTICE INST. (last visited Jan. 5, 2019), https://eji.org/judicial-
selection (noting that Alabama selects all their judges through partisan elections). 
58 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
59 Smith, supra note 30, at 291–92 (discussing the “dramatic decline in the percentage of voters 
who opposed capital punishment” after Furman and President Richard Nixon’s efforts to “move 
the Supreme Court to the right on criminal justice issues”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
60 Id. 290–91 (“After a slow start in 1973, death sentences hit a three-decade high of 149 in 
1974. In 1975, a whopping 298 death sentences were imposed–at the time, the highest year-end 
figure ever recorded.”). 
61 See id. at 328–29 (noting that voters are “likely to pay close attention to how judges approach 
the criminal side of their dockets”).  
62 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 30, at 72. 
63 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 8 (“The data suggests that override in Alabama 
is heavily influenced by arbitrary factors such as the timing of judicial elections, the politics of 
the county where the accused is prosecuted, and the outsized enthusiasm of certain judges for 
overriding jury life verdicts.”). The report further states: 
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Alabama face elections every six years,64 making voter appeasement a 
constraining concern. The Equal Justice Initiative reports that “[s]chol-
ars observe that, in a state where the majority of people favors the death 
penalty, ‘a judge who declines to hand down a sentence of death, or who 
insists on upholding the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign his own polit-
ical death warrant.’”65 Research has shown that during election years, 
judicial overrides increase in Alabama, indicating that sentencing some-
one to death is one of the most important political tools Alabama judges 
wield.66  
 
Prior to the legislation removing judicial override from 
Alabama’s statutory sentencing scheme, there was no language that 
required a judge to provide a clear reason behind the decision to 
override a jury’s verdict.67 The judge did not have to follow a formula, 
unlike the jury, in determining whether or not the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones.68 In Ex Parte Taylor,69 
the Supreme Court of Alabama enforced the notion that a judge needs 
to lay out the specific reasons for overriding a jury’s verdict.70  
                                                          
In one campaign ad, Alabama Supreme Court candidate Claud Neilson 
boasted that he “looked into the eyes of murderers and sentenced them to 
death.” Another candidate for the state’s highest court, incumbent Kenneth 
Ingram, ran a TV ad that opened with grainy videotape footage from inside 
a convenience store where, 20 years earlier, a teenager had murdered the 
owner. Here, said the ad’s narrator, “a 68-year-old woman, working alone, 
was robbed, raped, stabbed 17 times, and murdered. Without blinking an 
eye, Judge Kenneth Ingram sentenced the killer to die.” The victim’s daugh-
ter appears on screen to give her personal endorsement: “It was my mother 
who was killed, and Judge Ingram gave us justice. Thank heaven Judge In-
gram is on the supreme court.” Former Alabama Supreme Court Justice 
Harold See ran an ad in 2000 showing a newspaper headline that read, 
“Court upholds death sentences in two slayings” while the narrator stated 
that See was “fighting against minor technicalities that would let criminals 
off” and that “Justice See knows that drug dealers are dangerous criminals 
who threaten our children . . . . [He] has the tough on crime record to be 
Chief Justice.” 
Id. at 14–15. 
64 ALA. CODE § 17-14-6 (1975). 
65 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 16. 
66 STEVENSON, supra note 4, at 70 (“Judge overrides are an incredibly potent political tool. No 
judge wants to deal with attack ads that highlight the grisly details of a murder case in which 
the judge failed to impose the most severe punishment. Seen in that light, it’s not surprising the 
judge overrides tend to increase in election years.”). 
67 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1975). 
68 Id. 
69 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001). 
70 Id. at 1219 (“Under Alabama’s capital-sentencing procedure, the trial judge must make spe-
cific written findings regarding the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance 
and each mitigating circumstance offered by the parties.”). 
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However, that standard has not been upheld by the trial courts of 
Alabama.71 A defendant’s life can depend entirely on which judge 
receives their case and how that judge feels about the sentencing 
process, as well as other inconsistent factors such as lack of competent 
counsel and racial bias.72 
  
III. Impact of Hurst v. Florida 
 
A. Hurst v. Florida Upholds the Sixth Amendment Right to a 
Jury Trial and Strikes Down Florida’s Hybrid Capital Sen-
tencing Scheme  
 
Prior to its landmark decision in Hurst,73 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to address the inconsistency that was present in capital sentenc-
ing with regards to a jury’s responsibility in Apprendi v. New Jersey.74 
The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury, a statute 
that allowed a judge to consider specific facts in order to sentence a 
defendant with a hate crime that included a higher sentence was uncon-
stitutional.75 Specifically, the Court held that it was “unconstitutional 
for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant 
is exposed . . . .”76 Bryan Stevenson, founder and director of the Equal 
Justice Initiative, notes that the Apprendi77 decision is especially im-
portant because by addressing the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
in capital proceedings, “this broad characterization of the case cuts 
through any technical distinctions between the trial and sentencing 
stages of a capital case. It locates the right at issue to be the ‘right to a 
jury trial,’ and not merely the right to a fundamentally fair or consistent 
sentencing determination . . . .”78  
 
                                                          
71 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 169 So.3d 1, 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); Yancey v. State, 65 
So.3d 452, 480 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 
72 Shannon Heery, If It’s Constitutional, Then What’s the Problem?: The Use of Judicial Over-
ride in Alabama Death Sentencing, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 347, 394–95 (2010) (discussing 
the “host of . . . issues” impacting Alabama’s lack of “uniform[]. . . standard for imposing judi-
cial override”). 
73 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). 
74 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
75 Id. at 476. 
76 Id. at 490. 
77 Id. 
78 Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role 
of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2003). 
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A few years later, the Court used this important precedent re-
garding the Sixth Amendment and applied it to a capital case in Ring v. 
Arizona.79 In Arizona’s capital punishment sentencing scheme, a judge 
held the power to decide whether or not the necessary aggravating fac-
tors were present in a case to warrant the imposition of the death pen-
alty.80 The Court held that this system did in fact violate a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury, overruling prior precedent in Walton 
v. Arizona81 that held Arizona’s sentencing scheme constitutional.82 The 
Ring decision looked at Justice Stevens’ dissent in Walton, where he 
insisted that the Sixth Amendment did require “a jury determination of 
facts that must be established before the death penalty may be im-
posed.”83 However, Ring did not stop Alabama from utilizing judicial 
override, as the state courts in Alabama applied the Ring precedent very 
narrowly.84  Regardless, Ring and Apprendi set the stage for the Hurst 
decision.  
 
In Hurst v. Florida,85 Timothy Lee Hurst was charged and found 
guilty of first degree murder in Florida.86 The jury recommended the 
death penalty and the judge agreed.87 Hurst appealed, arguing that the 
sentence violated his right to a jury trial, especially in a post-Ring 
world.88 The majority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined 
by six other justices,89 held that Florida’s sentencing scheme was un-
constitutional because the “Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a 
judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s 
mere recommendation is not enough.”90 The Court specifically pointed 
to the new precedent set forth in Ring to justify why these hybrid sen-
tencing structures could not stand as constitutional.91 The Court firmly 
held that “the State cannot now treat the advisory recommendation by 
the jury as the necessary factual finding that Ring requires,” making 
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Florida’s use of the jury recommendation as advisory only unconstitu-
tional.92  
 
B. Delaware’s Judiciary Takes Control and Strikes Down its 
Capital Sentencing Scheme in the Wake of Hurst 
 
 
After Hurst,93 Delaware’s judiciary quickly ruled their own ju-
dicial override sentencing structure unconstitutional in Rauf v. State.94 
The decision found that Delaware’s capital sentencing scheme, which 
allowed a judge to fact-find any aggravating circumstances, as well as 
weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors before sentencing a de-
fendant to death, was unconstitutional.95 Interestingly, Delaware also 
upended the part of the death penalty statute that did not require juror 
unanimity in sentencing someone to death.96 The court’s reasoning ad-
dressed the possibility that there could be a narrow view of Hurst that 
allows a judge to have some control over the sentencing portion of a 
death penalty case.97 However, Chief Justice Strine wrote in his concur-
rence that he “find[s] it impossible to embrace a reading of Hurst that 
judicially draws a limit to the right to a jury in the death penalty context 
of having the jury make only the determinations necessary to make the 
defendant eligible to be sentenced to death by someone else, rather than 
to make the determinations itself that must be made if the defendant is 
in fact to receive a death sentence.”98 This decision in Delaware pre-
pared the stage for Alabama’s capital sentencing structure to be scruti-
nized and eventually upended.  
 
IV. ALABAMA’S LEGISLATION REMOVING JUDICIAL OVERRIDE AND 
MAKING THE JURY THE ULTIMATE FACT-FINDER 
IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 
 
Over the years, Alabama has received much scrutiny for its cap-
ital punishment system from public interest organizations, legal schol-
ars, and even the United Nations.99 The state’s citizens even began to 
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exhibit hesitancy towards using the death penalty after numerous studies 
pointed out its flaws, beginning in 2005 when only 63 percent of the 
population polled in Alabama supported capital punishment, a smaller 
number than years before.100  
 
In the wake of Hurst101 and Delaware’s decision in Rauf v. 
State,102 Alabama bore an unfortunate distinction: it became the only 
state in the country with judicial override, as well as having the highest 
per capita death sentencing rate and execution rate in the United 
States.103 The time had come to make a decision about whether or not 
to address the override issue directly or wait for the Supreme Court to 
intervene. State Senator Dick Brewbaker, a Republican, sponsored the 
bill removing judicial override from the capital punishment sentencing 
statute and made it clear to his constituents that it was not a stand against 
the death penalty, but protection against federal intervention.104 Other 
politicians discussed the moral implications of judicial override, while 
also professing respect for the judiciary of the state.105 
 
Senator Brewbaker introduced the legislation in February 2017 
and Governor Ivey signed it into law on April 11, 2017.106 The language 
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in the bill is crucial as it strikes all reference to “advisory” jury decisions 
and gives the jury back it’s decision-making and fact-finding powers.107  
 
 
V. JUDICIAL OVERRIDE IN ALABAMA IS NO MORE – WHAT NOW? 
 
Judicial override is no longer a part of Alabama’s state law, but 
the application of the new sentencing structure is proving to be another 
fight for defendants. A conflict between defense attorneys and prosecu-
tors in which defendants can benefit from the new sentencing scheme 
has already arisen.108  The law became effective on April 11, 2017 and 
state prosecutors argue that defendants “who were charged but not con-
victed of capital murder” prior to that date can still face the possibility 
of judicial override.109  Defense attorneys are fighting back, arguing that 
their clients who were charged, but not yet convicted, prior to April 11th 
are owed the same protection as any defendant who has been charged 
with a capital crime after the date.110  
 
The issue arises out of the vagueness of the new law, which ac-
cording to retired Judge John Carroll, “leaves open the question of 
someone who has been charged but not convicted . . . . It’s not crystal 
clear.”111 Prosecutors have argued that the act’s language stating that it 
“shall not apply retroactively to any defendant who has previously been 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death prior to effective 
date of this act” indicates that it is unambiguous and clear–defendants 
who were charged with a capital crime prior to April 11th are still at risk 
of having their jury sentences removed and replaced by a trial judge.112 
The drafter of the act, State Senator Dick Brewbaker stated that “‘[t]he 
intent of the legislature, and what we thought we were doing with pass-
ing the bill, was that upon signature of the governor, it would end judi-
cial override in Alabama . . . I think everyone in that chamber who voted 
for the bill thought, going forward, the juries’ wishes would be the last 
word in all case.’”113 
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The language in the act that needs to be analyzed is the phrase 
“convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.”114 The use of the 
words “convicted” and “sentenced” clearly only applies to defendants 
whose criminal cases were finalized prior to the enactment of the new 
sentencing structure, meaning defendants who had already been con-
victed and sentenced in a court of law. For those defendants who were 
pending trial after being charged with a capital eligible offense, the pro-
tection against judicial override applies to them. The legislative lan-
guage and intent is clear: it is time for judicial override to be eradicated 
in Alabama, and essentially, the United States.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Alabama should ensure that the legislation enacted in the wake 
of Hurst should be applied to all defendants charged with capital murder 
who are currently awaiting trial. The date of when they were charged 
does not mean that the legislation does not apply to them. In fact, they 
are exactly the defendants whom the legislation was intending to pro-
tect.  Alabama’s long, robust history with the death penalty is enough 
for the judiciary to approach this new sentencing structure with con-
sistency. While Alabama’s legislation removing judicial override is a 
step forward in the right direction, it needs to ensure that the effects of 
the law affect all its citizens equally.  
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